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D3.js: a JavaScript and web-based data visualization library using HTML, SVG and CSS. 
 
Data Exfiltration: illegal transfer of confidential data from a target network (victim) to a 
location which attacker can access the sensitive information 
 
Efficiency: the ratio of number of detected attacks (i.e. true positives) to all events 
identified as an attack (sum of true positives and false positives) (Staniford et al., 
2002). 
 
Heat Map: a common graphical representation of data. It is a visual analytical technique 
in which the data values represented in a matrix are given different colors. 
 
NetFlow: a series of packets between two hosts is combined into a single flow record 
which usually consists of the protocol, source and destination Internet Protocol 
addresses, the source and destination ports, payload size, session length and so 
forth (Goodall, 2007). 
 
Visual Analytics: a data analytical approach that combines interactive visualizations with 
automatic analysis methods for a more comprehensive perception, reasoning and 
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Security is essentially important for any enterprise networks. Denial of service, 
port scanning, and data exfiltration are among of the most common network intrusions. 
It’s urgent for network administrators to detect such attacks effectively and efficiently 
from network traffic. Though there are many intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and 
approaches, Visual Analytics (VA) provides a human-friendly approach to detect 
network intrusions with situational awareness functionality. Overview visualization is 
the first and most important step in a VA approach. However, many VA systems cannot 
effectively identify subtle attacks from massive traffic data because of the incapability of 
overview visualizations. In this work, we developed two overviews and tried to identify 
subtle attacks directly from these two overviews. Moreover, zoomed-in visualizations 
were also provided for further investigation. The primary data source was NetFlow and 
we evaluated the VA system with datasets from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST challenge 
2013. Evaluation results indicated that the VA system can detect all the labeled 







CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Presentlt, network systems and infrastructures are often enormous and complex, 
and tens of hundreds of servers and hosts are working simultaneously. A mass of 
network intrusions occur on a daily basis, trying to damage network service or 
compromise servers to steal confidential data and information. Confidentiality, integrity 
and availability are critical to any enterprise network infrastructures. Therefore, 
monitoring the status of network system and detecting intrusions are among the 
highest priorities of network administration and security analysts. Various approaches 
and solutions have been proposed and studied for intrusion detection, such as 
statistics-based, pattern-based, and rule-based (Liao et al., 2013).  
Although numerous algorithms and systems have been studied and 
implemented, humans are still critical part in the network security process. Visual 
Analytics system has attracted attention from industry and academia because of its 
significant involvement of human analysts. Simply speaking, Visual Analytics combines 
interactive visualizations with automatic analysis methods for a more comprehensive 
perception, reasoning and decision making process when we deal with massive and 






human analysts to analyze and explore the mass amount of datasets efficiently, as well 
as to perceive patterns, trends, and exceptions. With the increasing size of computer 
networks and continuous appearance of new types of attacks, the research on 
visualization for network security is facing more and more challenges (Cook et al., 2012). 
In a large scale of network, detecting “subtle” attacks from massive amount of network 
traffic is difficult. Preprocessing, extracting, and analyzing the “big data” in visual 
analytics systems and tools is still an open challenge. 
 
1.1 Research Topic 
The concept of information visualization has been proposed for more than 15 
years. Formally, information visualization includes the use of computer-supported, 
visual representations of data in order to enhance cognition with help of human 
exceptional perceptual capabilities (Card, Mackinlay, &Shneiderman, 1999).  
The basic idea of information visualization is to display the data in some visual 
forms and representations, in order to understand the data, get insights into the data, 
interact with the data directly and come to conclusions by human analysts. Moreover, 
visual data techniques have proven to be an effective way in exploratory data analysis 
and they also show high potential for exploring large volume of databases (Keim, 2002). 
Information visualization has provided us a different perspective to explore data, the 
aim of Visual Analytics is to facilitate our way of processing information and data 
transparent for an investigative discourse. Visual Analytics is a step further than 






exploration and decision-making, combining information visualization techniques, 
human factors and data analysis (Keim et al., 2008). 
This research primarily focused on designing and implementing a visual analytics 
system prototype to detect network intrusions, including port scanning, denial of service 
attacks, and data exfiltration. The characteristics of these attacks are heavily 
emphasized in the visual analytics, thus it is a characteristic-based approach. In 
particular, detecting subtle attacks from the massive amount of network traffic and how 
to extract the “right data” from “big data” are the primary interests. 
 
1.2 Significance 
Rapidly identifying and classifying malicious activities and intrusions through 
network traffic is a major challenge for human analysts exacerbated by complexity of 
data sets and functionally limited manual analysis tools. Even on a relatively small 
enterprise network, manual processing and analyzing of traffic data is extremely time 
consuming. Information visualization frees the human analysts from reading and 
examining large volume of data logs. A well-designed visualization graph can potentially 
summarize a week’s or even a month’s worth of network traffic and intrusion alerts, 
helping human analysts unearth the intrusion events. Additionally, visualization tools 
generally provide interactive components that facilitates human analyst to examine 
detailed information of any suspicious activities (Itoh et al., 2006). Comparing to 






intuitive, meaning no significant requirement of complicated mathematical or statistical 
knowledge (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012).  
Although there are many benefits of visualization systems for detecting network 
intrusions, developing a good analytical system and visualization tool is not an easy job 
because of the growth of network, the complexity of network traffic and the various 
types of network intrusions.  
The first challenge is the massive amount and complexity of the network traffic 
data. Camacho et al. (2014) pointed out that network monitoring for security shares a 
number of features with other Big Data problems, the so-called 4 Vs: Variety, Veracity, 
Volume and Velocity. Even though there have been numerous studies related to 
visualization of intrusion detection systems, many of them have difficulties when 
dealing with large-scale of network data (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012). In a 
network with hundreds or even thousands of servers and hosts, large amount of normal 
traffic data will cover the subtle attacks, which may use only a few traffic records, 
making them extremely difficult to be detected by conventional visualization. Therefore, 
this project tried to expand the research to focus on how to detect the subtle attacks in 
a large-scale of network effectively and efficiently. 
The second challenge comes from higher demand for the overall view of the 
entire network status (Zhao et al., 2014). Conventional visualization systems are often 
limited in providing a relatively low-level view of the network because in most cases it’s 
easier and more straightforward to visualize the low-level data. Consequently, human 






identify abnormal events and threats, which is often time-consuming and inadequate. A 
high-level view of the network status will significantly decrease the impacts of 
unnecessary details and amplify the underlying security events. Thus, providing an 
informative high-level view of the network status is another goal of this research. 
 
1.3 Scope 
This project primarily consisted of three major phases: design, implementation, 
and evaluation.  
Based on the behaviors of network intrusions, design phase identified the 
characteristics and patterns of different intrusions and summarize the data of interest 
that should be preprocessed and visualized. Three types of network intrusions are the 
primary interests of this research: port scanning, denial of service attacks, and data 
exfiltration. The system has multi-view of visualization, providing high-level overview as 
well as low-level details of points of interest. 
In the implementation phase, a web server powered by Node.js was set up, a 
MySQL database was used to store the raw and processed network traffic data, and 
visual components were implemented with a popular JavaScript visualization library 
D3.js. It should be noticed that D3.js is not security-specific; it’s no more than a 
web-based data visualization library using HTML, SVG and CSS. The ease of use, 
powerful visualization capability, and support for all major browsers make D3.js a 






Finally, the system was tested and evaluated with the dataset from Mini 
Challenge 3 of VAST challenge 2013 (VAST, 2013). The dataset was chosen because the 
data is NetFlow data, which is more appropriate for high level overview visualization 
(more discussion on this in Chapter 2). And the dataset is collected from a mid-sized 
network (approximately 1,200 servers and hosts), thus it’s large enough to test the 
scalability of the approach. The evaluation was conducted in two ways. The first is 
through analysis of ad hoc use-case attack scenarios, which is to analyze the timeline of 
some attacks events in the data (like when the attack happened and what hosts were 
the targets). This is a common technique in evaluation of security visualization (Shiravi, 
Shiravi, & Ghorbani, 2012). The second is a formal statistical evaluation by identifying all 
the suspicious activities in the dataset. Because Visual Analytics Challenge Committee 
(VAST) has provided ground truth for the dataset, it is convenient to evaluate the 
system in a systematic manner, such as calculating Type I and Type II errors. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
Because we’re primarily focusing on three types of network attacks, the 
corresponding research questions that were studied are: 
1. Is Visual Analytical approach capable of detecting denial of service attacks 
from NetFlow records? 







3. Is Visual Analytical approach capable of detecting data exfiltration from 
NetFlow records? 
Here we use statistical hypothesis testing to define the research questions more 
formally. False positive rate (FP) is the primary criteria and we set the thresholds as 0.10 
In other words, if the false positive rate is less than 0.10, we presume that the VA 
approach is capable of detecting intrusions. For denial of service attacks: 
Null hypothesis: FP <= 0.10 for detecting denial of service attacks 
Alternative hypothesis: FP > 0.10 for detecting denial of service attacks 
This is a one-tailed test and we assume a significance level of 0.05. Similarly, we 
have hypothesis for port scanning and data exfiltration respectively. 
 
1.5 Assumptions 
The following assumptions were identified as part of this research project: 
1. The system was evaluated by the dataset from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST 
challenge 2013. The dataset was treated as real network traffic data, even 
though how the data was collected was not officially released. 
2. Network traffic data collected was faithful to the actual network traffic and 
was not modified by any types of worms or attacks. 
3. The dataset used by the visualization system should follow a relatively strict 
format and content; other types of network traffic data might not be able to 






4. The ground truth released from the VAST challenge committee, which was 
used to evaluate the visualization, was considered correct and comprehensive. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
The research was conducted acknowledging the following limitations: 
1. The dataset used in the research only contains two weeks’ network data and 
the types of network intrusions may be not comprehensive. 
2. The dataset was artificially designed for visualization security study. 
3. In some cases, NetFlow records cannot provide completely trustworthy 
information of network intrusions. For example, a distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) attack with spoofed IPs may be seen as a denial of service attack (DOS) 
from one external attacker. 
4. The laboratory computer system had limitations in capacity and throughput, 




This research was performed with the following delimitations: 
1. The visual analytics system was designed to detect following types of network 
intrusions: port scanning, denial of service attacks, and data exfiltration. 






network attack information and is designed to evaluate modern cyber-security 
visual analytic approaches. 
3.  D3.js is suitable for data visualization with HTML, SVG and CSS. D3’s emphasis 
on web standards gives users the full capabilities of modern browsers. D3.js is 
not a security-specific visualization library. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined an overview of the research project, including the 
research topic, significance, question statement and scope. Assumptions, limitations 
and delimitations of the research have also been presented. In the next chapter, 








CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the past twenty years, various techniques and approaches have been 
proposed and heavily studied to detect network intrusions and attacks, such as 
statistics-based, pattern-based, rule-based and visual-based (Liao et al., 2013). Among 
them, visual-based approach attracts significant attention because of the interactive 
participation of human analysts. Human analysts have remarkable ability to handle 
novel patterns, outliners and exceptions. Comparing to other automated approaches, a 
visual analytics system provides human analysts with improved tools to detect 
anomalies, discover hidden patterns, identify inherent correlations, and communicate 
findings with colleagues (Goodall, 2008). 
 
2.1 Comparisons of Intrusion Detection Approaches 
Traditionally, there are two major approaches for intrusion detection, namely 
anomaly detection and misuse detection. With proposes and development of various 
systems and tools, people tend to subdivide these approaches into more subcategories 
(Liao et al., 2012; Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2011). Four common approaches for 







threshold-based, and visual-based. Other than these, pattern-based, state-based and 
heuristic-based are also widely used methodologies of intrusion detection. The 
algorithmic approach usually uses statistical tests, probabilistic analysis and models, or 
data mining to analyze network traffic (Jung et al., 2004). Abnormal network traffic and 
packets can be detected through this approach. Recently, Yen et al. (2013) designed a 
detection system called Beehive that automatically mines and extracts knowledge and 
insights from various logs data generated by a variety of network devices in a large 
enterprise. With the help of a common clustering algorithm (an adapted version of the 
K-means clustering algorithm), Beehive detected network intrusions (including the port 
scanning) that went otherwise unobserved by current security tools and personnel. Soft 
computing is similar to the algorithmic approach in many ways. Many methods in this 
approach use fuzzy logic-based algorithms, which provide flexible information 
processing for handing real-life ambiguous situations (Zadeh, 1994).  
The second approach is the rule-based approach, which applies various 
pre-defined rules and policies to detect abnormal and suspicious traffic (Kim & Lee, 
2008). In typical rule-based approaches, rules (If-Then or If-Then-Else) are used to build 
the model and profile of known and common intrusions. For example, in a rule-based 
system, a blacklist is often provided where all the traffic from the list’s IP addresses is 
automatically blocked by the firewall or intrusion prevention system. Pattern-based 








The third approach is threshold-based, which is an intuitive and widely used 
technique to detect network attacks above certain thresholds by examining happenings 
of event X across a Y-sized time frame (Gates, 2006). Nonetheless, it is rather difficult 
and needs careful investigation to set an appropriate detection threshold: a low 
threshold may mislabel some normal activates; whereas a relatively high threshold 
would have difficulties to detect some malicious network traffic (Paxson, 1999). 
The last approach is the visual-based. Visual-based approach is closely related to 
“security visualization” or visual analytics. Security visualization is a relative young term 
and it is a concrete field from the broader domain of information visualization (Marty, 
2008). Security visualization has the benefits of information visualization but demands 
novel and fine-tuned techniques for thorough and in-depth analysis, because common 
visualization systems have been constructed for use scenarios that are not well 
supportive of detecting intrusions from network traffic (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 
2011). Visual analytics puts more emphasis and efforts on human side, and it provides a 
solution that combines the strengths and powers of human analysts and electronic data 
processing. Because for most enterprise networks, security administration is still a 
process that needs human involvement, visual analytics approach enable people to 
derive insights from dynamic, ambiguous and massive data, synthesize information, 
discover the unexpected and outliners, and communicate efficiently for further action 
(Keim et al., 2008). 
An important advantage of visual analytics approach is the flexible incorporation 







approach can be used in visual analytics. Well-designed visual analytics components can 
significantly help human analysts to process and understand the information and 
underlying indications from other approaches. 
 
2.2 Categories of Network Security Visualization 
Like all the information visualization, network security visualization is data-driven 
process. Goodall (2007) organized the network security visualization into three major 
categories based on the level of network traffic data to be analyzed and visualized: 
packet trace visualization, NetFlow records visualization, and security events 
visualization. Shiravi, Shiravi, & Ghorbani (2011) provided a detailed list of possible data 
sources that are accessible and can be used in the implementation of visualization tools 
and systems, and the related three categories are given in Table 2.1. 
The first category is “packet trace visualization”, which is to visualize raw packet 
traces, the most granular level of network traffic data. Normally, packet trace data can 
be collected from packet analyzer such as Tcpdump and Wireshark. A network packet 
consists of two types of data: control information (also known packet header) and user 
data (also known as payload). A packet is the basic unit of data transmitted in a 
packet-switched network. Therefore, network packets theoretically contain all the 











Table 2.1 Potential Data Sources for Security Visualizations 
Event Type Data Source Device & Software 
Network 
Traces 
Packet Trace Tcpdump, Tshark, Wireshark 
NetFlow Records Cisco NetFlow NDE, Cisco NSEL NetFlow 
Security 
Events 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Cisco CSA, Cisco IDS, Enterasys Dragon, 
FortinetFortigate, Juniper ISG, SNORT, 
NiksunNetVCR, SourceFireSensor 
Intrusion Prevention Systems 
ForeScoutConterACT, Juniper NetScreen 
IDP, McAfee Intrushield, Radware 
Defense Pro, FireEye, Tipping Point X, 
IPAngel 
 
Visualization systems like Portall, Radial Traffic, VISUAL, TNV and Svision all use 
packet traces as the primary data sources (Fink, Muessig, & North, 2005; Keim et al., 
2006; Ball, Fink, & North, 2004; Goodall et al., 2005; Onut, & Ghorbani, 2007). Portall 
uses a “node and link” graph to represent the host and connection in a network. VISUAL 
utilizes scatter plot and IP matrix to depict the connections, allowing human analyst to 
check connection patterns between the internal network and external hosts. TNV is 
trying to provide a focused observation on packet level data without losing the 







thousand network packets in a 90 minutes time period. A matrix with connection is used 
to depict network activities of hosts over time and each host in the matrix is painted in 
different colors based on its level of connection activity. Multiple linked views are 
further used to display details of raw packets (Goodall et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 2.1 A screen snapshot of TNV system. 
 
An obvious drawback of packet trace visualization presents an incredible amount 







a relatively small network, the amount of involved packets is considerably significant, 
thus visualization at packet level is rather difficult and presenting too many unnecessary 
details to human analysts. As a result, packet trace visualization is more suitable in a 
hierarchy or multiple-layer deign, where detailed information of individual packets can 
be provided on demand (Goodall et al., 2006). On the other hand, systems like TNV are 
directly visualizing low-level network data in the overview without any aggregation and 
filtering. It’s rather difficult for human analysts to observe any significant patterns or 
discover the underlying security events. Thus it is meaningful to provide an informative 
high-level view of the network status instead of directly visualizing low-level data. 
The second category is “network flow visualization”, which is to visualize the 
network flow data. In network flow data, a series of packets between two hosts is 
combined into a single flow record. In practice, Cisco NetFlow NDE or Cisco NSEL 
Netflow can be used to collect the NetFlow data for enterprise networks. A NetFlow 
record is typically consisted of the protocol, source and destination Internet Protocol 
addresses, the source and destination ports, payload size, session length and so forth. 
Therefore, NetFlow records are much more compact comparing to packet traces by 
sacrificing details and real payload data (Goodall, 2007). 
Generally, such aggregations of packet trace in network flows remove the heavy 
burden of visualizing all the granular level details, thus it’s widely used in many security 
visualization systems. NVisionIP, VizFlowConnect, NetBytes Viewer and NFlowVis are all 
using NetFlow as the primary data source (Lakkaraju, Yurcik, & Lee, 2004; Yin et al., 2004; 







developed a system called “Isis”, which used progressive multiples of event plots and 
timelines to provide the iterative examination of network traffic using network flow 
data. 
 
Figure 2.2 User interface of NFlowVis system. 
 
Figure 2.2 displays the user interface of NFlowVis, which combines TreeMap 
visualization and a clustering algorithm to analyze NetFlow data. The user interface of 
the visualization system following a drill-down metaphor, guiding human analysts from 







should be noticed that they utilize a clustering algorithm to analyze the traffic data, and 
the authors believe such clustering technique is suitable for data visualization in 
large-scale network. This example illustrates an advantage of visual analytics: it can 
incorporate other techniques and approaches (like clustering algorithm or pattern 
matching) in the visualization. Because network flows are much more compact than 
packet traces, we believe that the network flow data is more suitable for explore the 
temporal relationships of network traffic in large-scale, and the system enables human 
analysts to organize the visualizations to disclose traffic structure more easily. 
The third category is “intrusion alert visualization”, which is to visualize the 
intrusion alerts from an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS monitors network 
traffic and generates security alerts for malicious activities or policy violations. There are 
many IDS products, such as Cisco CSA, Cisco IDS, Enterasys Dragon, and 
FortinetFortigate. Generally, intrusion detection in IDSs is an automated process 
(rule-based or signature-based) and the alerts data is a higher level of network traffic. 
Thus intrusion detection alerts data is a very common and important data source for 








Figure 2.3 User interface of IP Matrix system, where the left view displays network 
activities at Internet-level and the right view displays activates at local-level. 
 
Figure 2.3 is a snapshot of IP Matrix system, which directly visualizes the security 
alarms (Koike, Ohno, & Koizumi, 2005). The left view displays network activities at 
Internet-level and the right view displays activates at local-level. A security alarm 
generated by an IDS is mapped to a pixel inside the corresponding matrix cell and the 
color of the pixel indicates the type of the intrusion. There are many more systems 
utilizing the IDS alerts. For example, NIVA utilizes alert data from various intrusion 







link color indicates the severity of intrusions. The system is able to present millions of 
nodes, but will fail when the alert data is significantly large. VisAlert incorporates a 
novel visualization paradigm, which displays visual correlation of network attack alerts 
from various logs (Livnat et al., 2005). The authors argued that an alert must have three 
attributes, namely: What, When and Where. A chord diagram is used to display the 
three attributes of intrusion alerts. Zhao et al. (2014) use a similar radial graph in their 
visualization system MVSec. The radar view provides an overview of alerts events and 
their inherent associations. Intrusion alert visualization system are solely replying on the 
IDSs and a major problem of IDSs, is the massive amount of security alerts they generate. 
The massive alerts on a daily basis can easily exhaust security analysts (Debar & Wespi, 
2001). Systems like NIVA and VisAlert have difficulties when visualize intrusion alerts in 
a relatively long period of time. Additionally, false positives and false negatives are fairly 
common in IDSs, regardless of their detection mechanisms. Thus it’s impossible to solely 
rely on intrusion alerts. Packet trace or data flow data should be used to assist in 
reduction of false positives and improvement of the system. 
It should be noticed that there are many industry products in this category. 
Security Information and event management (SIEM) is a popular technology provides 
analysis of security threats and alerts (Ardito et al., 2000). Many vendors provide SIEM 
solutions, such as McAfee Enterprise Security Manager, SolarWinds Log & Event 
Manager, Splunk Enterprise, and HP ArcSight ESM. Although most of them have visual 
components, they are merely the visualization of the intrusion alarms from IDSs and the 







From the discussion above, it’s clear that these three levels of visualizations have 
different advantages and emphasis. Packet trace visualization focuses on the most 
granular level of network data, resulting in introducing too many unnecessary details. 
Network flow visualization is at a higher level, and more suitable for visualization of 
larger-size network. Intrusion alert visualization utilizes the alerts from IDS as data 
source, and often needs lower level of data (packet or flow) to assist in reduction of 
false alerts and improve accuracy. 
Here network flow data is chosen as the major data source because visualization 
of large scale of network is the foremost interest and concern in this research project. 
Packet trace and intrusion alert data can be used to extend the visualization or provide 
another level of information, but it’s not the primary goal of this research.  
 
2.3 Network Intrusions and Their Visual Detection Methodologies 
2.3.1 Port Scanning 
Port scanning is to seek open ports and available services on a network host by 
observing responses to connection requests (Vivo et al., 1999). Port scanning is very 
common, possibly the preliminary step in a network intrusion attempt. There are 
theoretically 65,535 ports for a computer host, where only small portions of them are 
“well-known” ports, such as 20 for FTP and 80 for HTTP. The many uncommon ports are 
probably being used by other software or services, depending on the situation. 
Attackers can uncover vulnerabilities of network hosts and launch corresponding attacks 







not a direct security threat by itself; however, security analysts can prepare for future 
attacks from the early detection of port scanning. In the practice, launching a port scan 
to a network or certain hosts is a trivial task with the help of software such as Nmap. 
Port scanning can be detected in many visualization systems and tools. One 
common approach is to visualize host connections to classify patterns of port scanning. 
Conti and Abdullah (2004) use parallel coordinate plots to visualize the network traffic 
information, including IP addresses and port numbers. They have found some significant 
visual patterns, which are results of some common port scan attack software. Parallel 
coordinate plot is very suitable to visual multi-dimensional data. Network traffic 
information, such as protocol type (TCP or UDP), source IP address, destination IP 
address, source port and destination port can be used for parallel coordinate 
visualizations, and common port scanning would have some obvious fingerprints in the 
visualization. 
In a similar approach, Jiawan et al. (2008) utilize network connections and mapped 
them to host-based visualization that highlights port scanning patterns in their system 
“ScanViewer”, as depicted in Figure 2.4. In the paper, the host-based visualization used 
nodes to represent hosts (IP addresses) and lines to represent their inner connections. 
In the Figure 2.4, the two nodes in circle clearly have the connection pattern of port 
scanning. However, in reality the network traffic data is extremely large and dynamic, 
and thus the port scanning traffic in this visualization may be obscured by high-volume 
ordinary network connections, and hence the port scanning patterns cannot be 








Figure 2.4 A snapshot of ScanViewer. It captures the pattern of port scanning or 
networking scanning. The two red-circled hosts are external attackers. 
 
Another widely-used visual technique is port based because port activity of a 
network is essentially vital in port scanning. Fischer and Keim (2013) combined some 
interactive visualization views in their visualization system, with a tree map to display 
the most active ports and node-link graphs to represent and examine inner connections 
between different ports of network hosts. Port based approaches can be easily show 









2.3.2 Denial of Service 
A denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack generally 
targets popular sites or services and attempts to disrupt or suspend the connection of 
the servers. A common method of DoS attack is server overload, which is to saturating 
the server with large amount of communications requests, making it cannot respond to 
legitimate requests normally. From the viewpoint of enterprise network, such DoS or 
DDoS attack is usually easy to be detected because the sudden high volume traffic to 
the internal servers. Similar to port scanning, DoS or DDoS attack has the obvious 
connection pattern: one or many external hosts (attackers) attempts to suspend the 
service of specific internal servers (one-to-one pattern or many-to-one pattern).  
Denial of service attacks can be readily identified by many visualization systems 
because of the extremely massive burst of network traffic. NVisionIP displays a snapshot 
of the activities of the network hosts, providing the information such as connection 
activity and port activity. In the cases where internal servers under surveillance are 
attacked by DDoS, human analysts will notice abrupt bursts in network traffic from 
these servers (Lakkaraju, Yurcik, & Lee, 2004). However, the authors also pointed out if 
the DDoS attack was adequately distributed, NVisionIP will not identify the attackers 
and victims, as the volume of network packets sent by each involved attacker will be too 
low to differentiate from normal network traffic. NVisionIP focuses on visualizing 
external hosts, namely the attackers. Another approach is to visualize the activity of 







limited of requests. Thus in most cases, denial of service attack in terms of server 
overload is quite easy to be identified.  
Other than the “flooding” method, denial of service can be launched by in many 
different ways, such as disruption of routing information or crash the server by 
malwares. These attacks don’t have the significant volume of involved traffic, but it can 
be detected by visualizing the working status of server (Zhao et al., 2014).  
 
2.3.3 Data Exfiltration 
Data exfiltration is another critical intrusion for any enterprise network and the 
possibility of a sensitive data leak lies among the highest fears of security analysts. 
Detecting data exfiltration is a challenging problem, because it’s not always easy to 
identify which data is leaving the enterprise network legitimately, and which data traffic 
is data exfiltration on purpose (Giani, Berk, & Cybenko, 2006).  
Unlike port scanning or denial of service attack, data exfiltration has no obvious 
pattern from network connections because it often occurs from one internal host 
directly to another external host. Moreover, network flow data doesn’t have the 
payload content, thus it’s impossible to directly visualize the payload or its signature. 
D’Amico & Kocka (2005) pointed out that volume of data transferred can be used to 
identify data exfiltration. In most cases, when large volume of data transferred occurs 
from a host that is not recognized for such activities, it might indicate a potential data 
exfiltration. Thus it is possible to identify data exfiltration through visualizing payload 







involve large data transfer or the exfiltration can be processed in a slow manner (such as 
slow scan), this detection approach of visualizing data transfer sizes is not 
comprehensive.  
Foresti et al. (2006) used another approach to identify data exfiltration. They 
believed they could characterize an external attacker with five distinct stages, which are 
reconnaissance, probe, attack, dig-in and migration. During the five stages, as it moves 
from normal network activity to data exfiltration, the visualization will show how the 
node under attack slowly emerges out of the background. For a subtle data exfiltration 
(no significant payload size), the attack stage might be difficult to be detected and 
visualized but the probe stage could provide more relevant information, which usually 
involves a network scanning or a port scanning. Goodall & Sowul (2009) detected data 
exfiltration in a similar approach. First they identify a slow scan, which took place over a 
period of about one hour. As they further investigate the event, they found that every 
connection to port scan attacker consisted of a small payload packet, so it is doubtful 
that the source host tried to steal any data. In this case, they also used an earlier probe 
stage to identify the data exfiltration. 
In the research project, because packet payload content is not available, large 
volume of data transferred from a host that is not recognized for such activities may be 








2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first provides a brief summary of different network intrusion 
detection approaches, which include algorithmic, rule-based, threshold-based, and 
visual. Next, it focuses on visual-based approaches and describes three levels of network 
security visualization based on different levels of networking data to be visualized, 
which are packet trace visualization, network flow visualization and intrusion alert 
visualization. In the last part of this chapter, four types of network intrusions (port 
scanning, denial of service attacks, botnets, and data exfiltration) and their visual 







CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will cover the methodology of the research project, primarily 
introducing and outlining the major research phases, system components, data sources 
and analysis, and system evaluation used in the project. 
 
3.1 Design Framework 
The design phase was the first and the foremost important step of the research. 
Based on the network flow data and characteristics of different types of intrusions, the 
visual analytics design was characteristics-based. On other words, the design primarily 
focused on how to represent and visualize patterns of intrusions based on the NetFlow 
data. Because the data is typically in large-scale, techniques such as aggregating and 
filtration were used to amplify the underlying security events. 
 
 







3.2 Major Research Phases 
The research project was consisted of three major phases as in Figure 3.1, 
though they’re not inherently independent.  
1. Designing the visual components of the system. This is the most important 
step of the research project. Generally speaking, the designing phase 
determined what information in the network traffic data would be used and 
how they would be visualized in the system. Based on the characteristics and 
patterns of different network intrusions, corresponding information and 
metrics of network traffic data were retrieved, summarized and visualized.  
2. Implementing the visualization system. Implementation phase included 
following procedures: preprocessing the data and importing it to a database, 
setting up the web server and coding the visualization part of the system. 
3. Evaluating the visualization system. For the dataset that was used in the 
project, information and facts about the network intrusions are listed in a 
separate file. Thus by comparing with the “ground truth sheet”, the 
visualization system can be evaluated. In fact, based on the feedbacks of 
evaluation, the designing and implementation of visual components were 
modified accordingly to achieve better results. This is like the typical iterative 








3.3 System Workflow 
A typical workflow for Visual Analytical systems is displayed in Figure 3.2 (Zhao et 
al., 2014). For this project, the first workflow was data preprocessing. After cleaning and 
aggregating the raw data, the preprocessed data were imported into database. The 
visual analytics component connected to the database, retrieving necessary information 
from the aggregated data. Meanwhile, the visual analytics components provided an 
interface for human analysts to interact with the system. 
Essentially, the system was a web application, which consisted of a backend 
database, a web server, and frontend web interface. 
1. A MySQL database was used to store the network traffic data.  
2. A simple web server powered by Node.js. Node.js is an open-sourced platform 
to build fast, scalable network applications.  
3. Frontend web interface was built with standard HTML, CSS and JavaScript. In 
particular, an open-sourced JavaScript library d3.js was heavily used to build 
the visualization components. It should be noticed that D3.js is not 
security-specific; it’s no more than a web-based data visualization library using 








Figure 3.2 A typical of workflow for the visual analytics system. 
 
3.4 Data Sources and Data Analysis 
In the evaluation phase, a dataset from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST challenge 2013 
was heavily used. The original dataset includes three separate CSV files: network traffic 
data, network hosts status data and network intrusion alert data. The network traffic 
data is the primarily data used in the research project. It contains of two weeks of 
network traffic data (flow-level) for an enterprise network, which includes 
approximately 1,200 hosts and server. The data has roughly 70 million data records, and 
takes about 4GB disk space. More specific, the network traffic data (NetFlow) contains 
IP addresses, port numbers, transaction payloads, transaction time length and other 








3.5 System Evaluation 
The evaluation was conducted in two ways. The first is through analysis of ad hoc 
use-case attack scenarios, which is a common technique in evaluation of security 
visualization (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012). In the ad-hoc evaluation, different 
types of intrusions, including port scanning attack, denial of service attack, and data 
exfiltration were fully evaluated. Ad-hoc evaluation is a typical way to evaluate a 
security system. Also, how the system is interacted with users (security administrators 
and analysts in this case) is also important, such as the process speed of the system, 
ease of use, and so on. 
The second is a formal statistical evaluation by identifying all the suspicious 
activities in the dataset. Aground truth sheet has been provided by the Visual Analytics 
Challenge Committee (VAST), and the security events have been labeled into two 
categories: “obvious” and “subtle”. Generally, subtle attacks is much harder to be 
detected, thus they are the primary interests of the evaluation process. It is convenient 
to evaluate the system in a systematic manner with ground truth, such as measuring 
efficiency, calculating Type I and Type II errors. 
Efficiency is defined as the ratio of correctly detected attacks (i.e. true positives) 
to all events flagged as an attack (sum of true positives and false positives) (Staniford et 
al., 2002). Type I and Type II errors are often used interchangeably with the general 
notion of false positive and false negative, respectively. False positive (Type I error) and 
false negative (Type II error) are two indicators to assess the accuracy of IDS system. 







malicious, whereas the false negative occurs if the system fails to classify malicious 
activity.  
FP and FN are very import factors when assessing an IDS system, but they are 
closely related to the volume of normal traffic compared with the volume of attack 
traffic (in other words, the acceptable rate for FP and FN are quite different for different 
networks). For example, given that attacks are fairly infrequent comparing to the normal 
traffic, even when the FP rate is quite low, there are still massive false alerts generated 
by IDS (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2011). In the case, the FP rate (10% or less) is 
still not acceptable for the network intrusion system. However, for evaluating this 
system prototype, false positive rate 10% is adequate and acceptable in most cases 
considering the relatively small number of alerts raised. Therefore, in our research, the 
hypotheses (the proposed visual analytics approach is capable of detecting subtle 
attacks from network flow records) will be accepted when the false positive rate is less 
than 10%, otherwise it will be rejected.  
There are other merits widely used in evaluating IDS, such as efficiency and 
detection rate. They were all calculated in the evaluation part, but not as the criterial to 
assess the hypothesis of the research question. Goodall (2009) uses a popular packet 
capture analysis tool called Wireshark in the evaluation for the comparison purpose. In 








3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of research methodology of this research 
project. At first, it covered the three major phases for this research: namely designing 
phase, implementation phase, and evaluation phase. This is a typical cycle for software 
development. Next, the software and visualization libraries used in the research project 
were introduced and they either have free versions or are open-sourced software. At 








CHAPTER 4. VISUAL ANALTYICAL AND OVERVIEW DESIGN 
Overview design is the first and most important step in the project. Before that, 
we must gain some understanding of and insight into NetFlow data, which is the primary 
data source format for this project. The insights will guide and facilitate the overview 
design process, and in the meantime feedback from the overview will broaden our 
knowledge about NetFlow data. This is a “mutual benefit” process. 
In the process of creating the overview design, three primary goals are of 
particular interest. The first is to highlight suspicious events or hosts from normal 
background traffic data. This is the fundamental purpose and function of an overview. In 
particular, it is challenging and significant to search for subtle attacks in the overview 
because they usually hide deeper in the traffic and are more difficult to detect. By 
“subtle” we mean attacks with few related inconspicuous NetFlow records, or in a very 
short period of time, or with some characteristics that make them more difficult to 
detect. 
Second, the overview should be scalable. As discussed in the literature review 
section, some effective intrusion detection methods have difficulty with a large amount 
of network data. This is generally normal for visual analytics because many VA solutions 







abnormality will become inconspicuous in a large amount of data. If VA solutions rely 
only on the raw data to visualize and do not provide an effective method (such as data 
mining) to reduce the negative impact of the data size, scalability is rather hard to 
satisfy. 
In our overview design, we are not using the conventional visual techniques 
(such as time series or connection visualization) directly; instead, we are trying to 
highlight security events based on the attributes of aggregated NetFlow records and 
characteristics of intrusion attacks. Therefore, the overview in our approach has some 
degree of scalability. 
The last goal is to make the overview extendable. Even though three types of 
attack are the primary interest of the project, the VA solution in our project should 
provide general information about network status (situational awareness) and the 
ability to be extended to detect other network security attacks in the future. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, with these three motivations in mind, the process of 
visual analytical and overview design and details of the VA system are presented and 
discussed, with emphasis on the characteristics of NetFlow and the features of network 
attacks. In particular, conventional visual analytical techniques, such as time series plots 
and heat maps, are discussed to address why they do not fit into the overview directly 
but can be useful in other ways. Then two primary overviews of this project are 
presented, explaining why they can enable human analysts to identify network 








4.1 Time Series Analysis 
NetFlow is the primary data source for the project, and a significant 
characteristic of NetFlow data is that every entry is associated inherently with a 
timestamp that indicates when the NetFlow is recorded. Therefore, time series analysis 
is a straightforward method to inspect NetFlow data. 
A simple way to visualize data associated timestamp is to display the number of 
NetFlow records (NetFlow count) over a time interval. Figure 4.1 illustrates a time series 
of NetFlow count on April 13 for Big Marketing Network. Because this time series simply 
counts how many NetFlow entries were recorded per minute, it can reveal intensity of 
network activity: A strong peak in time series generally indicates a sudden event 
involving a great number of NetFlow entries, which may be a normal network traffic 
peak, a denial-of-service (DOS) attack, a port-scan attack, or a number of other options. 
 







From Figure 4.1, it is clear that there are several significant peaks between 6 a.m. 
and 9 a.m., the number reaching almost 10,000 per minute at one point. This is 
abnormally huge, considering the baseline number. Most of these peaks in the early 
morning are actually the consequence of a port-scan attack targeting a few internal 
servers. Other than the noticeable peaks, however, time series analysis provides little 
insight regarding network status. For example, from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., the time series 
seems flat, and if there were a data exfiltration event (which usually uses very few 
NetFlow records to communicate), it would be difficult to detect from the NetFlow 
count time series. Therefore, the drawback of time series analysis in this case is obvious: 
Only NetFlow count is inspected and under consideration, whereas subtle network 
threats involving only a few NetFlow records cannot be seen easily from the overview. 
Attacks such as data exfiltration and malware infection are generally related to a very 
limited number of hosts and NetFlow records. 
Analysis of Figure 4.1 shows that it is impossible to find various attacks based on 
one parameter (NetFlow count). An improvement over this approach is to present 
different parameters (attributes of NetFlow) for time series analysis at the same time, 
such as number of distinct IP addresses, number of distinct port numbers, and so forth, 
as in Figure 4.2. In this multiple time series, the blue graph at the top represents 
NetFlow count, the orange graph in the middle represents distinct source IP addresses, 
and the green graph at the bottom represents distinct source port numbers. Observing 
and comparing these three graphs simultaneously reveals more details of network 







and trends, indicating that attackers might use different ports to increase the 




Figure 4.2 Multi-Time series of NetFlow count, IP count, port count for 
Big Marketing Network in Apr 13 
 
Multi-time series can provide information about different aspects of network 
traffic. Potentially, it can depict one time series for each NetFlow attribute. This is still 
not a great solution to the problem, however. First, it is not easy to find correlations 
between the graphs. If we present six time series graphs at the same time, finding the 
relationships among them is not easy for human analysts. Second, multiple time series 







overshadowed by obvious and significant network traffic and events. Therefore, even 
though time series analysis is a good approach for analyzing network traffic trending 
from different angles and providing general situation awareness information, it is not 
always scalable when dealing with a large amount of network traffic data. 
 
4.2 Heat Maps Analysis 
A heat map is a common graphical representation of data. It is a visual analytical 
technique in which the data values represented in a matrix are given different colors. 
Essentially, time series spread the data along one parameter, which is usually a 
timestamp. Because heat maps display data in a matrix, it is appropriate to present the 
distribution of data in two dimensions. As with time series, an inevitable disadvantage is 
that subtle events will be overshadowed by other more significant events and normal 
background traffic. In a 2-D heat map, we can break NetFlow into different matrix cells 
according to their attributes to highlight both obvious events and subtle ones. Ideally, 
subtle security events can be extracted from the background data by some attributes. 
This is also a core notion in our VA design, which relies heavily on the characteristics of 
intrusion attacks. 
In NetFlow content, in addition to timestamp and IP information, a few fields are 
closely related to attacks of interest: port number, payload size, and session duration. 
Port-scan attacks are clearly associated with targeted ports because the purpose of a 
port scan is to retrieve information about the port activities of hosts. Payload size is a 







information about the real content of payload, and we can only rely on the payload size 
to find suspicious traffic; an unusually large payload size generally indicates a potential 
data exfiltration. Meanwhile, monitoring payload size has some possible use; many 
companies strictly forbid uploading or downloading large files through enterprise 
networks. In the NetFlow data, there are two fields related to flow payload: 
“firstSeenSrcPayload” and “firstSeenDestPayload.” This is because NetFlow represents a 
series of packets transferred between two hosts, possibly indicating direction. In this 
case, “firstSeenSrcPayload” means the total payload of all packets to “firstSeenSrcIP,” 
and “firstSeenDestPayload” means the total payload of all packets to “firstSeenDestIP.” 
Furthermore, attacks such as denial of service and port scanning often present 
smaller payload size and shorter session length than usual. This is easy to understand; A 
normal user visits a website and would expect to retrieve content from the website, but 
an attack that launches a denial-of-service or port-scan attack attempts to shut down 
the service or simply obtain port information as quickly as possible, resulting in small 
payload size and short session duration. 
Similarly, it is impossible to detect redirection behaviors via HTTP status code or 
packet headers because NetFlow does not provide such information. In a common 
server redirection, an external user connects to the infected server, and usually the 
page will be redirected to external malicious websites right away, resulting in extremely 
small payload size and short duration. As a result, small flow size and short flow 







This analysis demonstrates that payload size and session length are two key 
parameters in the detection of network attacks such as data exfiltration, denial of 
service, and server redirection. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 A heat map for NetFlow in Big Marketing 
 
Therefore, NetFlow duration and payload can be used as primary attributes in 
heat maps. Figure 4.3 shows a heat map for Big Marketing Network’s NetFlow, where 
the x-axis represents session duration length (in seconds) and the y-axis represents 







NetFlow and darker cells indicate more NetFlow recorded in that range. In Figure 4.3, 
some cells in the matrix are blank with no color pixel, which means that there were no 
NetFlow in those ranges. 
A heat map can be used to represent distribution of NetFlow in a time frame, 
such as 1 hour, 1 day, or even 1 week. A potential problem here is that one heat map 
displays only a chosen time period; it cannot clearly present changes in network status 
(trending during the time period), which is important in analyzing security events. 
Security analysts need to go through many heat maps to monitor a network. For 
example, if one heat map represents 1 hour of NetFlow, 2 weeks of data for Big 
Marketing Network will produce approximately 336 graphs, and examining all of them is 
a tedious job. On the other hand, if the time frame if too long, such as 1 day or even 1 
week, the overview potential loses a lot of information because it is impossible to use 
color to represent one day’s network status; should it represent the maximum, 
minimum, or average value? 
 
4.3 Duration-Payload Overview Design 
From the analysis of time series and heat maps, we see that both have inherent 
disadvantages for dealing with NetFlow data. In this analysis we combine the two visual 
techniques for our overview, producing a heat map that contains time series plots in the 
matrix. Heat maps can help separate data into groups based on their attributes, and 








As we discussed in the previous section, session length and payload are primary 
attributes that can help distinguish malicious NetFlow records from normal ones. As 
seen in Figure 4.4, session duration and payload size are presented on the x-axis and 
y-axis, respectively, and each cell marked as a rectangle represents the time series for 
NetFlow count in the corresponding range during 2 weeks. For example, the bottom left 













Surprisingly, there are only a few peaks in the range of 10 bytes payload, while 
most rectangular cells have no visible peaks. In this implementation, the time series 
map has no color representation, and each cell in the map uses the same linear scale on 
the y-axis; in other words, the highest count determines the y-axis domain for all cells. 
In this way, every cell can be compared easily because they use the same scale. A 
significant drawback of such a design is that some small-count events cannot be seen 
easily from the overview because the largest count can be a thousand times or even a 
million times larger than others. This is why only a few cells have visible peaks—because 
their NetFlow counts in these cells are significantly larger than other ranges’ values. In 
fact, further study confirmed that those significant peaks represent denial-of-service or 
port-scan attacks. 
A better method is to use a logarithmic scale in the y-axis. A logarithmic scale can 
display small numbers better, as in Figure 4.5. Obviously, more peaks become visible 
with a log10 on the y-scale in each rectangular cell. Nevertheless, people generally have 
difficulty perceiving the values in a logarithm. For example, log10(100) = 2 and log10(1000) 
= 3. Though 100 and 1000 are very different quantities, 2 and 3 are relatively close when 
using visual representation. In Figure 4.5, it is difficult to tell the difference among the 









Figure 4.5 Duration-Payload Overview Design with uniform logarithmic scale 
 
If all the matrix cells use the same scale on the y-axis, it is difficult for analysts to 
understand the overview. As in heat maps, color can be used to further distinguish 
different ranges of time series values. In other words, different scales are represented 
on the y-axis with colors, as in Figure 4.6. The shades of green represent the scale in 
each cell; the darker the shade, the larger the scale. If two cells have the same green 
background, they are using the same scale on the y-axis. The scale value increases by 









Figure 4.6 Duration-Payload Overview Design with colored scale 
 
Essentially, Figure 4.6 contains the same data that Figures 4.4 and 4.5 do, but the 
data in this visualization, even very small amount of NetFlow, can be seen and 
compared easily. A closer look at Figure 4.6 indicates that the cells with the background 
of the darkest green are the ones visible in Figure 4.4, because those are the time series 
with the largest values (NetFlow count). 
In Figure 4.6, the values chosen for different ranges need careful consideration. 
On the y-axis, the payload size in bytes basically increases by an order of 10—0, 1, 10, 







the payload values. The situation is quite different for duration length on the x-axis, 
however. Many normal NetFlow sessions last 3 or 4 seconds, and very few last 1 or 2 
seconds, so we pay more attention to the lower durations by dividing length into 9 
ranges for Big Marketing Network: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5~9, 10~99, 100~999, and > 1000 
seconds. Ideally, analysts should be able to define the ranges in their own 
implementations because normal ranges will vary for different networks. 
After discovering potential problems from the overview, we provide a 
second-level visualization that offers a zoomed-in view of the cell graphs in the overview. 
When the user clicks on any cell graph in the overview, the system will automatically 
open a larger, zoomed-in image of that cell graph, as seen in Figure 4.7. The larger graph 
is a scatter plot, where each point represents the count for 1 hour. We use 1 hour as the 
time frame because we are dealing with 2 weeks of data. If the data is for 1 day, the 
time frame can be changed to minutes. 
 
 







Furthermore, an important feature of the VA overview is that it enables users to 
analyze multiple cell graphs simultaneously. Analysts can choose a few cell graphs in the 
overview, and the second level will visualize the content in the overview at the same 
time by applying different colors to the scatter plot points. To distinguish the points 
more clearly, each cell graph will be randomly assigned a border color that is highlighted 
when the cell is chosen, as shown in Figure 4.8(a), and the corresponding points in the 
second layer visualization will use that color, as shown in Figure 4.8(b). We think this 
feature is essential in the VA overview design because it enables users to discover 
potential patterns and relationships between the cell graphs in overview instead of 
regarding them as isolated graphs. In the next chapter, we will see that many security 
events are visible in multiple cell graphs and can be detected more easily from the 
overview. 
Though Figure 4.8(b) provides multiple colored points for comparison, it is not 
easy for human analysts to see the small-count points because most of them are 
together at the bottom of the graph, as the green points in Figure 4.8(b) are. Instead of 
just using a linear scale, users can choose a logarithmic scale to spread the points, as in 









Figure 4.8(a) Duration-Payload Overview Design with three chosen cells 
 
 








Figure 4.8(c) Scatter plot for the three selected cell graph with logarithmic scale 
 
In the next chapter, we will discuss in detail how the Duration-Payload overview 
can effectively help human analysts identify network intrusions and provide situational 
awareness. 
 
4.4 Host-Flow View 
Performing visual analytics on a big data set is akin to using a microscope. When 
using a microscope, people generally find the area they are interested in under low 
magnification and investigate it further under high magnification. It is difficult to use 







overview plays the role of low magnification. It identifies the interesting or suspicious 
time point and hosts, but it needs a means to investigate the events in detail. 
The second level of visualization provides a zoomed-in view of the time series 
graph, but it is also necessary to visualize the content of NetFlow. This brings us to the 
third-level visualization, a Host-Flow view to provide information at the NetFlow level. 
When users select any point in the second level’s scatter plots, the Host-Flow view 
provides the content of NetFlow related to the selected data point. 
As seen in Figure 4.9, the most detailed level is a visualization of network traffic 
flow between two groups of IP addresses, generally one group of external hosts and one 
group of internal hosts. Parallel coordinates visualization is a popular approach to 
visualizing multidimensional information. NetFlow records contain multiple attributes, 
such as source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port 
number, flow payload, and session duration. Each of these attributes is represented by a 
vertical coordinate in the graph. 
 A NetFlow data record will be visualized as a line, with corresponding 
intersections at the coordinates. The default attributes in a parallel coordinates 
visualization are source IP address, source port, destination port, destination IP address, 
source payload, destination payload, session duration, and timestamp. In practice, users 
can change the setup by adding or removing coordinates to satisfy their needs. The lines 








Figure 4.9 Parallel Coordinates visualization with 1000 NetFlow records 
 
A potential problem for parallel coordinates visualization is the number of 
NetFlow records to be visualized in one graph. If the number is too high (1,000 or more), 
the visualization will be very difficult to analyze, as seen in Figure 4.9. Here we use a 
very simple approach to solve the problem. Starting with the data point in level 2, 
instead of visualizing all the NetFlow records, we randomly choose 100 records and use 
them in the parallel coordinates visualization. Can this sample represent the population? 
In most cases, especially in attack scenarios, the answer is yes. The primary reason is 
that the first two levels of visualization have separate NetFlow records in different 
groups, so the records for one data point in the second level (scatter plots) should 
exhibit uniform behavior to some degree. In some rare cases, such as in a distributed 
denial-of-service attack, some attackers may become invisible after visualization, but 
analyzing all NetFlow records to the internal targets will easily reveal the whole picture. 








Figure 4.10 Parallel Coordinates visualization with selection feature 
 
An important feature in Host-Flow view is the user-defined selection. Users can 
select any range of coordinates to highlight in NetFlow records, as in Figure 4.10. In this 
example, the user chose to investigate traffic from 10:20 a.m. to 10:50 a.m. with a 
source payload of 140~180 bytes. Any NetFlow records in those ranges is highlighted 
automatically. 
In Host-Flow view, if two records have the same values for all attributes, they 
will merge into a single line and cannot be distinguished from each other. Therefore, the 
user can define a coordinate to represent the amount of NetFlow. The NetFlow count is 
important in analyzing potential security events, such as denial-of-service and port-scan 
attacks. For example, hundreds or thousands of packets sent to the server in a very 
short time may indicate a denial-of-service attack. If there are only a few NetFlow 
records, it is highly possible it is just normal web traffic. Therefore, NetFlow count can 







4.5 Host-MaxConn Overview 
The Duration-Payload overview provides network traffic patterns for detecting 
intrusions, but it does not provide any information about the internal hosts at the 
overview level. A host-based (IP-based) visualization provides information or the status 
of each host of interest. We believe such visualization is important in the overview 
design because the status of internal hosts (such as important servers) is vital to 
network administrators for monitoring the network system.  
Host-based visualization is suitable for detecting intrusions that target certain 
hosts because it treats every host separately. From the previous overview, some slow or 
subtle port scans cannot be seen easily. The primary characteristics of a port-scan attack 
are largely related to how many distinct internal “addresses” are accessed by an 
external host during a short time of period. The “address” here is actually representing 
IP address and port number because we’re dealing port scanning here. To detect port 
scanning, we visualize the characteristics of a port scan for each internal host. Similarly, 
such host-based visualization can be extended to denial of service, data exfiltration, or 







Figure 4.11 Host-MaxConn Overview 
 
Because it is a host-based design, a potential problem is scalability. If an internal 
network has only a few hosts, visual representation of the hosts is relatively 
straightforward. But when the number increases beyond about 200, the visual design 







by allocating more space to them. Servers are the central part of enterprise networks, 
and we should pay more attention to them. For a typical enterprise network, even one 
with several thousand hosts, the number of servers is limited. For example, in the data 
set of VAST 2013, Big Marketing Network has approximately 1,200 hosts, and 22 of 
them are servers (web server, DNS server, e-mail server, and so on). In Figure 4.11, the 
very first chart represents external IP addresses, and the other three below denote Big 
Marketing Network‘s three internal network sites. In the three internal horizontal 
coordinates, IPs for the servers are placed in the middle and take more space; personal 
hosts are placed at the two tails of the coordinate evenly.  
The bigger concern is the external IP visualization. In our design, one chart is 
used to visualize status of external IPs because attackers should be identified (at least 
partially) from the overview. However, theoretically, there are approximately 4 billion 
legitimate IP addresses (this is only for IPv4), and it is impossible to visualize them in any 
way. In reality, a significant amount of them are not active (in other words, they are not 
visiting any internal servers or reached by internal hosts). Therefore, in our design, we 
only visualized active external IP addresses and put them uniformly in the horizontal 
chart. In the case of Big Marketing Network, only about 200 active external hosts appear 
in the 2 weeks’ data. If the number increases to a certain amount, external IPs will be 
grouped to decrease the number of display IPs. Therefore, even though this is a 








In Figure 4.11, the vertical axis represents the maximum connection rate for 
each IP address, with upward lines representing inbound and downward lines 
representing outbound. Connection rate represents how many distinct connections 
were built during a unit time, where connection is defined by IP address and port 
number. For a particular host, the value of the blue line represents the maximum 
number of distinct outbound connections the host has made, and the red line 
represents the maximum inbound connections. Host-MaxConn is used to find a host 
that has an uncommon connection rate. When a user clicks on a suspicious host, a 
corresponding Host-TimelineConn view provides time series information for the 
selected host, as in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Host-TimelineConn view for one host 
 
Host-TimelineConn visualizes time series data for a chosen host, instead of the 
maximum value. In Figure 4.12, it’s easy to see that the X-axis represents time stamp, 
and Y-axis represent inbound and outbound connection rate. In order to show their own 







view provides trends and patterns for a host’s connections, which could be very helpful 
when analyzing a host’s activities. From our study, most of port scan attackers don’t 
connect to the internal frequently, and the sudden increase of connection count can be 
an important characteristic of potential external attackers. Finally, we can also use 
Host-Flow view to analyze any data points of interest in a Host-TimelineConn 
visualization. Therefore, for the two overviews (Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn), 
analysis procedures are similar: identify suspicious activities or hosts in the overviews, 
analyze timeline in the second-level visualization, and investigate security events in 
Host-Flow view. 
A host-based overview can provide direct and precise information and status for 
each host of interest, allowing analysts to discover intrusions targeted at particular 
hosts. Even though here we use port scan as an example, the host-based overview can 
be also be used to detect other kinds of network intrusions and provide situational 
awareness information for important servers. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we primarily introduce and describe two types of overviews: 
Duratoin-Payload Overview and Host-MaxCoon Overview. We believe the former one is 
capable of analyzing network traffic patterns and trending, whereas the latter one is 
more suitable for providing information and status on per host basis. Other than the 
two overviews, there are several zoomed-in visualizations, to investigate any suspicious 







human analysts to identify IP or time point at overview, and investigate further with 
zoomed-in views. In the next chapter, we’ll describe how the VA system can be applied 







CHAPTER 5. SECURITY EVENTS ANALYSIS 
Based on characteristics of NetFlow data and network intrusions, we have 
designed two overviews for the project: Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn. The 
former is designed to present traffic patterns according to NetFlow’s session duration 
and payload size, and the latter will display maximum incoming and outgoing 
connection rates on a per-host basis. In this chapter, we will discuss how to apply these 
two overviews to identify network intrusions, especially focusing on denial of service, 
port scanning, and data exfiltration. Multiple-level visualizations, which provide more 
detailed information, will also be used. 
 
5.1 General Guides to Read Duration-Payload Overview 
The Duration-Payload overview provides facts on the distribution of NetFlow 
records and timeline information. Moreover, it can help human analysts determine 
network status, such as incoming traffic patterns and trends. Thus, it also provides both 
situational awareness and intrusion detection alerts. Situational awareness is important 
for intrusion detection systems because even the best system cannot cover all types of 
attacks. Therefore, to detect possible abnormalities, we have to know what the network 







As we discussed in the previous chapter, session duration and payload size are 
two important attributes in NetFlow. An unusually short duration and small payload 
generally indicate a port-scan or denial-of-service attack; while long duration and large 
payload mean a large file transfer, which is possible data exfiltration. It should be noted 
that there is no strict line for the duration length and payload size; they will vary for 
different networks. Overall, however, most NetFlow records with mid-range session 
duration and payload size are normal traffic. This conclusion is applicable only when we 
analyze NetFlow data. If we have the real content of the payload, that requires a totally 
different approach. 
In Figure 5.1, the cell graphs in the blue rectangle are the “normal” zone, and we 
are assuming most of the records within it are normal traffic to servers. Apart from the 
mid-range criteria, an important characteristic of a normal cell graph is that it contains 
consistent and regular traffic data, which means if the NetFlow data in that range are 
normal, it should be visible many times during the 2 weeks, not just a burst of traffic or a 
significant isolated peak. Further study identified some NetFlow records related to 
intrusion in this normal zone, but most of them are regular network traffic according to 









Figure 5.1 Duration-Payload Overview with normal zone (blue rectangle) and suspicious 
zones (red rectangles) highlighted 
 
On the contrary, the bottom left corner with very short session duration and 
very small payload size is probably the result of denial-of-service or port-scan attacks, 
while the top right corner with very long session duration and large payload size may be 
related to data exfiltration. We will discuss the details of these graph cells in the 
following sections. From the graph, it is clear that many of those cells contain isolated 
peaks, which means that normally there are no NetFlow records in that range, and the 









Figure 5.2 A zoomed-in scatter plot for “normal” activities 
 
A Duration-Payload overview also provides situational awareness to some 
degree. From the overview in Figure 5.1, a careful investigation indicates that all the cell 
graphs have a blank period during the 2 weeks. When we zoom in to the scatter plot in 
Figure 5.2, from the afternoon of April 7 to the end of April 10, there is no sign of any 
server activity. The ground truth states that Big Marketing Network had network 
maintenance during the weekend, so no servers were running during that period. From 
this example, it is clear that the overview can provide network status in addition to 
detecting intrusions.  
Another example usage of Figure 5.2 is to analyze trends in server access. In 
Figure 5.2, the red dots in the second week have an obvious pattern. The red dots peak 







Further analysis from the host-flow view indicates that traffic related to red dots is 
actually mail service. As a result, we have a general knowledge of the users’ pattern of 
accessing mail service in Big Marketing Network. 
 
5.2 Denial of Service Attack Analysis 
A denial-of-service attack is generally relatively easy to detect because it is 
usually related to a large number of NetFlow records. An unexpected burst of incoming 
network traffic may indicate a denial-of-service attack on internal servers. Therefore, 
the number of NetFlow records is a primary characteristic for identifying 
denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore, attackers usually use very little or no payload for 
attack in order to use network bandwidth to send more packets. Thus, a small request 
payload is another important characteristic of a denial-of-service attack. In Figure 5.3, 
the blue rectangular zone contains NetFlow records potentially related to 
denial-of-service attacks for Big Marketing Network. 
Because background color in the cell graphs represents the scale of the y-axis, 
we should start with the darkest green to find the highest traffic rate. In the blue 
rectangle in Figure 5.3, many of the cell graphs are the darkest green, indicating that 
their NetFlow amounts are very large. The payloads are all under 100 bytes, but the 








Figure 5.3 Duration-Payload overview with DOS attack zone 
 
Because denial-of-service attacks usually come with a significant traffic burst to 
one or many internal servers, we should focus on peaks from the overview. With the 
help of a zoomed-in scatter plot, Figures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) display the NetFlow records 
potentially related to denial-of-service attacks. Figure 5.4(a) highlights cell graphs with 
the largest y-scale, and Figure 5.4(b) shows the corresponding records count per hour. 









Figure 5.4(a) Duration-Payload overview with nine cell graphs highlighted 
 







In Figure 5.4(b), there are four obvious peaks formed from points with different 
colors, all marked with red rectangles. Potentially, these four events are 
denial-of-service attacks because the flow count reaches 1 million per hour, which is 
significantly larger than normal. Further study showed that the first two events are 
indeed denial-of-service attacks, but the last two events were port scanning. In this case, 
these two port-scan attacks involved an unusually large amount of traffic, and we will 
cover this more in the port scan section. 
After identifying the suspicious events, we can use host-flow view to further 
investigate the first two denial-of-service attacks; Figure 5.5(a) displays a data point 
from the first event on April 2. There are 10 external hosts (in the first coordinate) using 
different ports to target port 80 of internal web server 172.30.0.4. In a sense, this is a 
distributed denial-of-service attack because there are multiple external attackers. 
Further investigation of other data points in the same region indicated that this attack 
was targeting only one web server (172.30.0.4), indicating that there are over 10 million 
records (sum of the data point amount in Figure 5.4[b]) associated with this web server 
during 1 hour or so. We can use a user-defined host-flow view to investigate this 
server’s behavior during the attack. In this step, we can remove attributes such as 
source port, payload, and session duration and add a count coordinate to represent the 











Figure 5.5(a) Host-Flow view analysis for a data point 
 
 
Figure 5.5(b) Host-Flow view analysis for activities of web server 172.30.0.4 
 
Figure 5.5(b) depicts the activities of web server 172.30.0.4 on April 2 and 
highlights the high-count NetFlow records. These highlighted records are related to the 
denial-of-service attack. From the first coordinate, which represents external IPs, we can 







approximately 5:20 a.m. and ended at 7:00 a.m. At approximately 7:02 a.m., there is a 
10-minute gap with no records, marked by a red circle in the figure. This is possibly the 
result of a denial-of-service attack that temporarily crashed the web server. After 7:15 
a.m., the server was back to normal and the denial-of-service attack was over. 
The analysis above shows that denial-of-service attacks are relatively easy to 
detect primarily because of the large amount of traffic. A Duration-Payload overview 
and scatter plot can be combined to identify the attacks, while a host-flow view 
provides a clear timeline for the attack. Human analysts can identify the external 
attacker, the internal victim, when the attack happened, and the consequences through 
a multiple-level visualization. 
 
5.3 Server Redirection Analysis 
Compared to denial-of-service attacks, a server-redirection attack is usually more 
difficult to detect. There are generally two phases in a server-redirection attack: hacking 
and redirection. In the first phase, servers are hacked by external attackers through a 
virus or malicious code injection. This is usually very difficult to discover based solely on 
NetFlow data because the corresponding packets may have normal payload and 
duration attributes. In the second phase, redirection, the primary characteristics are 
unusually short session duration and small payload. It is difficult to define a “usual” 
range clearly because the attributes vary for different hosts and servers. Moreover, 
many complex websites are hosted on multiple servers, and many automatic 







For normal web servers, session lengths should follow a relatively consistent 
pattern. Session lengths vary, but there should be certain values that are distributed in a 
range. When a server is hacked, however, the incoming traffic will usually be redirected 
to another external malicious website after a short time.  
Therefore, the average duration will decrease significantly, and the payload will 
normally decrease because users do not send further requests (packets) to servers after 
redirection. 
This analysis suggests that each cell graph in the Duration-Payload overview 
should have relatively consistent traffic. Variation is acceptable as long as it is within a 
reasonable range; users’ visits may vary. If there is a significant traffic gap, or if there is 
noticeable traffic some of the time but none at all at other times, it is reasonable to 
assume that something happened to the servers. 
It is possible that the servers are configured differently (such as to host other 
websites) or have been hacked, but otherwise a server’s NetFlow data and behavior 
cannot change significantly during two weeks or a short period of time. For example, in 
Figure 5.6, the cell graph in the blue rectangle shows significant traffic in the first few 








Figure 5.6 Duration-Payload Overview with a cell graph highlighted 
 
The activities in blue rectangle of Figure 5.6 are suspicious because traffic 
distribution for normal-running servers does not usually change all that much. 
Inspecting the NetFlow records shows that it is all incoming traffic to web server 
172.20.0.4. Because the overview allows us to check the Duration-Payload distribution 
for a specific server, we can take a closer look at the NetFlow records for server 
172.20.0.4, as seen in Figure 5.7(a) and Figure 5.7(b). It should be noticed that Figure 5.6 








Figure 5.7(a) Duration-Payload Overview for web server 172.20.0.4 
 







Web server 172.20.0.4 clearly exhibits a significant traffic shift from the blue and 
orange rectangles to the green rectangle. Here we ignore the high peaks in the darker 
green cell graphs because they usually indicate denial-of-service or port-scan attacks. To 
clearly present the shift, we can put data from those three cell graphs into a 
second-layer visualization, as seen in Figure 5.7(b). 
It is easy to see that on April 3, incoming traffic undergoes a very suspicious 
change: The session duration significantly decreases to 0 seconds, and incoming payload 
decreases as well. What does a 0-second duration mean? We know that NetFlow 
combines a series of packets between two hosts, and 0-second duration means that at 
most a couple of packets are transferred between the hosts before the connection is 
terminated. To further investigate the changing NetFlow records, Figures 5.8(a) and 
5.8(b) shows NetFlow data; 5.8(a) is from a blue dot in 5.7(b), and 5.8(b) is from a green 
dot in 5.7(b). 
 








Figure 5.8(b) Host-Flow view for server 172.20.0.4 after redirection 
 
As seen in Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b), source payload size (incoming traffic to 
servers) of NetFlow decreases from 1,900 bytes to 190 bytes, and session duration 
declines from 3 seconds to 0 seconds. The payload size decrease is significant, but the 
session duration decrease is not so obvious because it is only 3 seconds. Such consistent 
changes still call for careful investigation, however. 
It is difficult to explain the shift if it is not the result of a server reconfiguration or 
a redirection attack. We can see that the shift happened at around 10:00 a.m. on April 3, 
but it is difficult to confirm when the server was infected with malware because 
attackers can initiate the redirection any time after infection, and the NetFlow that 
contains malware cannot be detected without the payload. Ground truth confirms that 









Figure 5.9 Duration-Payload Overview with one cell graph highlighted 
 
From the analysis, we can see that server redirection can be identified by short 
session duration and small payload, but a traffic pattern shift may not necessarily 
indicate an attack. For example, in Figure 5.9, a cell graph is highlighted in a blue 
rectangle because data are shown in the second week but that cell is completely blank 
in the first week. Such a situation usually requires attention because it indicates the 







reveals that three mail servers in Big Marketing Network are responsible for the pattern 
shift. Our example is mail server 172.20.0.3, seen in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Duration-Payload overview and scatter plot for mail sever 172.20.0.3 
 
In Figure 5.10, the small graph in the top left corner is the Duration-Payload 
overview for mail server 172.20.0.3. Two cell graphs, highlighted in blue and orange, 
clearly contain most of the normal traffic. We ignore other cell graphs with peaks here, 
because we know those peaks are produced by denial-of-service or port-scan attacks. In 
Figure 5.10, the blue points represent NetFlow records with a payload of less than 100 
bytes, and the orange points represent NetFlow records with a payload of more than 







alteration is still relatively large. Nevertheless, there are two indications that this is not 
an attack. 
First, despite the blue and red points, their distribution patterns during a day are 
very similar: high peaks in the morning that decline to a relatively consistent level. This 
corresponds to people’s behavior. We check our e-mail when we start to work in the 
morning. Because usually some e-mail was received the previous night, the number of 
e-mails we need to send in the morning is relatively high. During the day, we frequently 
check e-mail or send them to others, and overall the traffic to mail servers will be at a 
consistent level.  
Second, the changing point is on April 8 and April 9, when we know server 
maintenance took place and Big Marketing Network was down. Therefore, it is very 
possible that the administrators reconfigured the servers during that time, resulting in a 
shift in traffic. Based on these two observations, it is highly possible this traffic shift for 
mail server 172.20.0.3 is normal. Ground truth does not list any related attacks to this 
server. 
 
5.4 Data Exfiltration Analysis 
In the Duration-Payload overview, a very suspicious zone for data exfiltration 
attacks is the top right corner; those cell graphs show relatively long sessions and large 
payloads. These two characteristics give us the main way to distinguish a data 







In data exfiltration, an attacker will generally steal the information through a 
web or file transfer protocol (FTP) tunnel. Because NetFlow data are generated from a 
series of packets between two machines, a data exfiltration attack will normally 
generate a record with large payload and long session duration. If an attacker 
transferred only minimal data, it would be almost impossible to detect using NetFlow 
data because the data exfiltration record would be the same as that of other normal 
records.  
 









Figure 5.11(b) Second level visualization: enlarged time series for the two NetFlow 
 
In Figure 5.11(a), two cell graphs with records are in the top right corner, 
significantly away from the others. Their session lengths are in the ranges 10–99 and 
100–999 seconds, and, notably, the payload sizes are both in the order of 108 bytes, 
significantly larger than any other. Figure 5.11(b) confirms that there are only two 
NetFlow records, occurred in Apr 6th and Apr 7th respectively. 
The parallel coordinates in Figure 5.12(a) provide more detail. For these two 
events, the attacker is external host IP 10.7.5.5 and the victim is web server 172.10.0.40. 
The source ports for these two events are both 20, indicating they are using FTP. Port 21 
on the external FTP server, which is used to establish the connection between two hosts. 







million bytes. The payload is actually from the external FTP server to the internal host, 
but here we still consider the two events to be data exfiltration. 
 
 
Figure 5.12(a) Host-Flow for the suspicious NetFlow record 
 
 
Figure 5.12(b) Host-flow between FTP server and internal host 
 
In Figure 5.12(a), we see that the second data exfiltration event (orange line) 







establish the connection. We can use a host-flow view to investigate further by setting 
10.7.5.5 as the source IP and 172.10.0.40 as the destination IP. With NetFlow records, 
sometimes there is a mix-up between the source IP and the destination IP because the 
traffic collector does not catch the first packet (this is why they are called firstSeenSrcIP 
and firstSeenDestIP, and this is inevitable in NetFlow).  
In Figure 5.12(b), NetFlow records related to port 21 are highlighted. On April 7, 
there is a record from internal host 172.10.0.40 to the external FTP server; the 
timestamp is marked in the red circle. This establishes the connection for the second 
data exfiltration, which is missing in Figure 2.11. We have the whole picture here for the 
two data exfiltration events. 
April 11 is suspicious because the internal host seems to have been trying to 
connect to the FTP server again (orange line in Figure 2.12), but there is no significant 
payload this time (actually, it is zero payload). It is possible the attacker was trying to 
pull off a third data exfiltration but failed somehow. From this example, we can see that 
the host-flow view can be used to investigate any events of interest, providing the 
timeline for analysis. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we use the VA system to identify security events in 2 weeks of 
VAST data. First, Duration-Payload overview and Host-Maxconn overview can be used to 
highlight NetFlow traffic and hosts related to attacks. Zoomed-in timeline visualizations 







information. The multiple-level VA system is able to not only discover security intrusions 
but also provide timelines for these events for further investigation. We have 
successfully identified denial of service, data exfiltration, server redirection, and port 
scanning through the VA system. In the next chapter, the VA system will be evaluated 








CHAPTER 6. SYSTEM EVALUATION 
In the previous chapter, we described how the VA system can be used to detect 
network intrusions and abnormalities in detail. Furthermore, the VA system can provide 
situational awareness for the network by presenting and analyzing traffic patterns. To 
prove that the VA system is capable of detecting attacks effectively, however, a 
thorough evaluation is necessary. 
In this chapter, we will present a systematic evaluation of the VA system. The 
ground truth for the Big Marketing Network data will be the primary criteria for the 
evaluation process, such as calculating false positives and false negatives in the VA 
system. It should be noted, however, that the ground truth lists only network intrusions 
but that the VA system can also highlight and identify abnormalities in the network that 
are not necessarily related to attacks.  
Because overview is the most important feature in the VA system, the evaluation 
process will focus primarily on overviews. In other words, for the 2 weeks of data, we 
are primarily interested in how the overviews can help detect intrusions and what 








6.1 Background and Attack Traffic Analysis 
When evaluating intrusion detection systems, we need to have more insight into 
the size of normal and malicious network traffic. For example, if there are 100 NetFlow 
records and 10 of them are malicious records, it is relatively easy to target the records 
related to intrusions. When the traffic size increases to 10,000 records, however, finding 
the corresponding 10 records is rather difficult. Therefore, background and attack traffic 
analysis is presented here. 
For data exfiltration, there are two intrusion records, and Table 6.1 displays the 
background network statistics for when data exfiltration happened. Here we can see 
that during the two data exfiltration events, the background traffic rate is rather high 
compared to the attack traffic rate. Moreover, the durations are only 125 seconds and 
63 seconds, which is not significantly long. The only notable characteristic is that the 
data transfer size is very large compared to normal traffic. 
 











4/6, 10:36 125 103 41.1 1.0 









Similarly, Table 6.2 provides scanning and background network traffic statistics 
related to two port-scan attacks, and the first one is obvious and second one is subtle. 
The “obvious” port scanning on April 6 has a very significant attack traffic rate, which is 
270.18 flow/s. Comparing to background traffic rate, more than half of the traffic was 
associated to the port scan event. Moreover, the duration is also very long (100 
minutes). All of these factors make this port scanning relatively easily to be identified.  
In contrast, the subtle only lasted 5 minutes and attack traffic rate was 0.60 
flow/s. As a result, filtering out the background traffic to detect port scanning in such 
cases is rather difficult and needs more effort. 
 









4/6, 11:10 100 8 447.14 270.18 
4/7, 7:00 5 6 20.75 0.60 
 
Background and attack traffic analysis is not meaningful for denial-of-service 
attacks, however. In typical denial-of-service attacks, the attack traffic rate is much 
higher than the normal background traffic rate, making these attacks easily detectable 








6.2 Metrics Evaluation 
In the process of evaluating intrusion detection systems, true positives, true 
negatives, false positives, and false negatives are the most fundamental metrics. 
Because the ground truth lists all intrusions, we need to count the true positives that we 
can identify from the overview. For the Duration-Payload overview, we focus primarily 
on denial-of-service attacks and data exfiltration. Even though server redirection can be 
identified in this case, there is only one server redirection attack. For the Host-MaxConn 
overview, the main goal is to identify port-scan attacks. 
 







In the Figure 6.1, we have highlighted the suspicious zones for different types of 
intrusions, and our primary goal is to identify denial of service attack, server redirection, 
and data exfiltration, although port scanning are also identified as we discussed in the 
previous section. The suspicious zones with different colors and number labels are 
discussed here: 
1. Red Zone. The red zone identifies denial-of-service attacks. In the 
Duration-payload overview, quite a few cell graphs have peaks in similar positions, 
marked by the red rectangle. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are four 
significant peaks; the first two are indeed denial-of-service attacks, and the last two are 
port-scan attacks (these cannot be counted as false negatives because they are 
intrusions). So for the category of denial of service, the two attacks are both successfully 
identified, and there is no false negative or false positive. 
2. Yellow Zone. The yellow zone identifies server redirections. Two cell graphs 
are selected in this case because they both have significant but inconsistent traffic 
records during the 2 weeks. Our investigation (discussed in Chapter 5) showed that the 
left one is server redirection, but the right one is not. Further analysis indicated 
reconfiguration on some servers, resulting in the traffic pattern shift in the right one, 
but it is not a server redirection attack. For the category of server redirection, the 
server-redirection attack is successfully identified, and there is one false positive. 
3. Blue Zone. The blue zone identifies data exfiltration. The Duration-Payload 
overview reveals two cell graphs that contain NetFlow records potentially related to 







duration. Our study showed that these two records are between one internal server and 
one external FTP server, and ground truth confirms that these two events are data 
exfiltration. For data exfiltration, all the related attacks have been identified, and there 
are no false positives or false negatives. 
4 and 5. Purple and Green Zones. These two zones are not specific for any type 
of attack, but they contain some isolated peaks. The two peaks in the purple zones are 
actually port-scan attacks, as seen in Figure 6.2, where a wide range of destination ports 
of internal servers are scanned, from 80 to over 55,000. Because we do not evaluate 
port-scan attacks in the Duration-Payload overview, we do not count these isolated 
peaks either as true positives or as false positives. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 NetFlow records from purple zone 
 
From an analysis of the different zones in Figure 3.1, we get the four metrics for 
the overview, as shown in Table 3.3, where TN is true negative, FP is false positive, FN is 







Table 6.3 Standard metrics for Duration-Payload Overview evaluation 
 Predicted Label 
Normal Intrusion 
Actual Class Normal 21(TN) 2(FP) 
Intrusion 0(FN) 12(TP) 
 
From Table 6.3, we can see that there is even no false negatives, indicating all 
the intrusions (denial of service, server redirection and data exfiltration) are identified 
successfully. Next, we can calculate detection rate and false positive rate based on these 
metrics. 
Detection rate (DR) is defined as the ratio between the amount of correctly 
identified attacks and the total amount of attacks, that is: 
DR = TP/ (FN + TP) = 12/(0+12) = 1.0 
False positive rate (FP) is defined as the ratio between the amount of normal 
NetFlow that are mistakenly identified as intrusions and the total amount of normal 
NetFlow, that is: 
FP = FP/(TN + FP) = 2/(21+2) = 0.087 
From the results of detection rate and false positive rate, we can see that all the 
denial of service attacks and data exfiltration were successfully identified and the false 
positive rate is only 0.087. Remember the null hypothesis for DoS attacks, FP <= 0.10 for 







hypothesizes for denial of service attacks and data exfiltration. In other words, based on 
evaluation of VAST data set, Duration-Payload can effectively identify DoS attacks and 
data exfiltration. 
On the other hand, for the Host-MaxConn Overview, we effectively identified all 
9 external port-scan attackers, including 7 obvious attackers and 2 subtle attackers 
during the two weeks. There was only one external host, which was labeled as attacker 
incorrectly. Moreover, there are quite a few external hosts with significant inbound 
traffic, and they are possibly normal external servers. The data is summarized in Table 
6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Standard metrics for Host-MaxConn Overview evaluation 
 Predicted Label 
Normal Intrusion 
Actual Class Normal 20(TN) 1(FP) 
Intrusion 0(FN) 9(TP) 
 
Similarly, in this case, detection rate is 1.0, and false positive rate is 0.048. 
Remember the null hypothesis for port scan attacks, FP <= 0.10 for detecting port scan 
attacks (significance level 0.05). Therefore, we accept the null hypothesizes for port scan 
attacks. In other words, based on evaluation of VAST data set, Host-MaxConn is capable 







6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we evaluate the two overviews systematically. A background and 
attack traffic analysis reveals that subtle attacks are indeed difficult to detect from 
massive network traffic. We investigate the two overviews, calculating detection rate, 
false-positive rate, and specificity. Detection rate and specificity can reach over 0.9, and 
the false-positive rate is below 0.1. Therefore, detection of the four types of attacks 









CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
In the previous chapters, we briefly stated reasons to apply visual analytics to 
network security and intrusion detection. Related literature was presented and 
discussed, indicating that many visual analytics systems do not provide an appropriate 
overview to detect subtle intrusions effectively. Research methodology was presented 
in Chapter 3, including research framework, system components, primary data sources, 
and system evaluation criteria. In Chapter 4, the VA system was described in detail, 
including two overviews (Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn) and several zoomed-in 
visualizations. The functions of these approaches were discussed by presenting how to 
use them to highlight various characteristics of network intrusions. Therefore, our 
approach is a characteristics-based VA approach. In Chapter 5, three primary attacks 
types (denial of service, data exfiltration, and port scan) were discussed, showing how 
to use the VA system to identify these attacks in the VAST data sets. Interestingly, server 
redirection can also be identified from Duration-Payload overview. Finally, we evaluated 
the VA approach systematically with the data set’s ground truth, showing that it is 







Based on the VA system and evaluation results in the previous chapter, we can 
draw the following conclusions: 
(1) The Duration-Payload overview is capable of detecting denial of service and 
data exfiltration effectively. For the VAST data sets, false positive rate is only 
0.087, which is significantly less than our pre-defined criteria 0.10 with 
significant level 0.05. 
(2) The Host-MaxConn overview is capable of detecting port scanning effectively. 
For the VAST data sets, false positive rate is only 0.048, which is significantly 
less than our pre-defined criteria 0.10 with significant level 0.05. 
(3) Duration-Payload overview can be used to detect server redirection based on 
the patterns of network traffic. 
(4) Zoomed-in visualizations can facilitate analyst investigations of security 
events and provide situational awareness. 
(5) Characteristic-based visual analytics approaches have been proven to be 
effective and practical in detecting subtle attacks from network traffic data. 
The approaches also provide some degree of scalability considering the size 
of Big Marketing network. 
 
7.2 Future Work 
The visual analytics approach developed in this project has been proven capable 
of identifying both obvious and subtle intrusions from massive network traffic. Future 







(1) Evaluate the system with another data set and optimize the system 
accordingly. Because we evaluated the VA system only with the VAST data 
set, it would be better to test and evaluate the system with other data sets. 
(2) Incorporate a more highly automated process into the VA system so that 
identifying suspicious network traffic can be done more intelligently. 
(3) Extend the system to detect other network intrusions, such as botnets, 
malware infection and other application-layer attacks. Currently, the VA 
system focuses only on three common types of network intrusion. 
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